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ABSTRACT
Research efforts in the security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
have dramatically increased over the past few years. However, there
is a limiting factor when work cannot be evaluated on real-world
systems due to safety and operational reasons. This has led to
multiple deployments of ICS testbeds covering multiple sectors
including water treatment, power distribution and transportation
networks.
Over the last five years, we have designed and constructed ICS
testbeds to support cyber security research. Our prior work in
building testbeds culminated in a set of design principles and lessons
learnt, formulated to support other researchers in designing and
building their own ICS testbeds. In the last two years we have taken
these lessons and used them to guide our own greenfield large-
scale, complex and process-diverse security testbed affording a rare
opportunity to design and build from the ground up – one in which
we have been able to look back and validate those past lessons and
principles.
In this work we describe the process of building our new ICS and
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) testbed, and give an overview
of its architecture. We then reflect on our past lessons, and con-
tribute five previously unrecognised additional lessons based on
this experience.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computer systems organization→ Embedded systems; Re-
dundancy; Robotics; • Networks→ Network reliability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) form the backbone of modern day
infrastructure, responsible for the delivery of services considered
critical from a societal perspective [3]. Due to their critically, the
EU recently imposed new legislation in the form of the Network
and Information Systems directive (NIS), mandating that operators
of critical national infrastructure (CNI) conform to a set of baseline
principles. This acknowledgement of the threat posed to ICSs from
a cyber security perspective comes after several years of high-
profile attacks [15, 17], and an increasing number of identified
vulnerabilities in common components and software [16].
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), established by the
UK government, for example, currently advises operators on their
journey towards NIS compliance1. This is where academia can play
the strongest role, conducting research to provide feedback into
regulations and associated guidance, enhancing operators’ capabil-
ity to defend against attacks. However, this does not come without
its challenges. Due to the critical nature of these systems access is
highly restricted, presenting a roadblock when one seeks to engage
in practical research activities [12]. As information surrounding
the infrastructure can be deemed highly sensitive, access could
be forbidden. As a system failure could have catastrophic impact,
deployment of experimental infrastructure into live systems is not
acceptable without extensive prior evaluation. This forms a key
requirement for the use of testbeds, supporting practical research
within a safe, controlled environment.
Over the last five years, we have designed and constructed ICS
testbeds to support cyber security research. Our initial concepts,
built out of Lancaster University [10], formed a starting point for
the exploration of vulnerability scanners [1], intrusion detection
systems [14], process comprehension [11], etc. This culminated in
a set of design principles and lessons learnt, formulated to support
other researchers in the design and construction of their own ICS
testbeds [12].
1https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/nis-directive
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Our work has progressed across the last two years, developing a
greenfield testbed at the University of Bristol. This new facility has
heeded advice from our existing design principles and lessons learnt,
resulting in the rapid deployment of familiar technologies, and
additional expansion towards the construction of a comprehensive
pool of equipment and resources.
The Bristol testbed is far larger in scale than our previous efforts.
Rather than focus on a single physical process as was the case pre-
viously we incorporate multiple physical processes (see Section 3),
and the associated physical infrastructure. This is backed up by a
training and prototyping setup, as well as a mobile demonstration
unit which also can be remotely integrated to form part of the main
testbed. The testbed has also dramatically increased in complexity,
with the addition of technologies to explore issues of convergence
between operational technology (OT) and information technology
(IT), and also where industrial internet of things (IIoT) and building
management systems (BMS) interplay with traditional OT.
Building this second testbed from the ground up has provided us
with a rare opportunity to evaluate our previous design principles
and lessons. Throughout this process we also identified a set of
new lessons, and extension of existing design principles. This paper
revisits our existingwork and highlights where lessons remain valid,
where they are now considered less critical, and which (in practice)
are a challenge to follow. We show that diversity, scalability and
complexity are key principles for a testbed. However, data capture
and safety are a matter of context. Through the combination of
our old and new lessons we hope that groups who embark on their
own ICS testbed projects can gain from our experience and this
blueprint for building testbeds.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of our research aims and design requirements
for the testbed. Section 3 provides an overview of the new testbed.
Section 4 revisits our existing lessons learnt, reflecting upon them
with our recent experiences, which leads us to propose a set of
additional lessons found through the design and construction of
our new testbed. Section 5 discusses a deployed use case within
the new testbed and provides reference back to key design features
of the testbed and where our latest explorations fit within that
landscape.
2 MOTIVATION
Our previous work set out a preference and justification for the
development of a large-scale physical testbed infrastructure that is
capable of closely replicating real-world scenarios [12]. This work
was heavily influenced by discussion with industry to ensure a
realistic approach. Whilst approaches that adopt the use of device
and system simulation exist, ultimately they are limited in terms of
the credibility offered during a wider range of research activities,
and often result in the interconnection of physical devices into the
simulated environment [7]. To highlight the possible research areas
one may seek to explore within an ICS context, we present a set of
use cases. From these we derive core testbed requirements/design
principles, subtly extending viewpoints comprehensively described
in our earlier work [12].
2.1 Use Cases
The following use cases have been highlighted as areas in need
of further study and have been derived through engagement with
government, industry, and the academic community. This is not
an exhaustive list, however we focus on these five areas. Together
these afford a high-level viewpoint from which testbed require-
ments/design principles can be formed.
Convergence. One of the key areas that requires further ex-
amination is the convergence of ICS/OT technology with other
instances of OT, as well as the convergence with other technolo-
gies such as Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). For example, what
happens when a physical process is located alongside a building
management system, which is more likely to be connected to the
internet, or insecure off-the-shelf IoT devices are used? Introduc-
ing IIoT devices and concepts into the OT environment can also
introduce new methods of exploitation, which need to be explored.
Security Analysis of ICS Devices. Security vulnerabilities are
constantly being found within ICS devices and, with new devices
and protocols being released to the market, they need to be studied
to identity any potential unknown vulnerabilities.
Intrusion Detection. Intrusion detection within ICS environ-
ments is still an ongoing area of research. There is a wide scope for
exploration of novel approaches to intrusion detection within ICS
environments, in particular in converged environments wherein
behaviour may be more complex and, hitherto, unknown.
Dataset Generation. There are limited datasets available for
ICS security research, especially at scale. A particular goal of ours
is to produce datasets that can be made public, including attacks
against the ICS environments. As configuring testbeds for data
collection can be a time intensive process, we aim to keep this as
straightforward as possible and have designed this in from the start.
Human Factors. Further exploration is needed in the area of
human factors in ICS security. This both includes how operators
react under pressure and the implications that can have for security,
as well as looking to build novel interfaces for security-related
interactions with ICS equipment.
2.2 Requirements for an IIoT and ICS testbed
Using the aforementioned use cases and our existing work [6, 12]
as a base, the following five high-level requirements are formed,
supporting our core research challenges.
Requirement 1: Diversity. The testbed should contain a range
of devices and software, from multiple manufacturers, covering
both legacy and non-legacy deployments. This allows the testbed
to replicate a variety of real-world deployments—where organic
growth is the norm rather than greenfield deployment—with a high
degree of accuracy.
Requirement 2: Scalability. With diversity of equipment, in-
cluding both physical processes and control devices, comes both a
monetary and time cost. ICS devices are expensive, and it can be a
time intensive process to install and configure new devices. On the
other hand, building to scales similar to those found in industry can
prove useful for experimentation. The testbed should both be able
to support multiple devices and processes at scale, but also provide
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methods to increase scalability with a reduced cost, for example
through simulation and virtualisation.
Requirement 3: Complexity. With increased scale and diver-
sity comes complexity, both in managing the testbed, and deploy-
ing experiments. This is amplified by the requirement of special-
ist knowledge for many aspects of working with ICS equipment,
such as logic programming and OT specific communication proto-
cols. Measures should be taken to reduce such complexity for both
testbed maintainers, and researchers.
Requirement 4: Data capture. The testbed should be capable
of appropriate data capture for experimentation, including when
the system is under (simulated) attack.
Requirement 5: Safety. The testbed should be designed such
that it poses minimal risk in terms of safety to researchers and engi-
neers. As well as safety of the individuals, the testbed itself should
be safe from outside influence, including unwarranted attack.
3 TESTBED OVERVIEW
Next we provide an overview of our testbed infrastructure. Figure 1
offers a high-level view of the testbed architecture. This can be used
as a reference point in the identification of critical components and
their position within the testbed as a whole. Each core category is
tied back to use cases and associated testbed requirements outlined
in Section 2.1, affording clear links between category attributes
and the requirements they support. These links are summarised in
Table 1.
Figure 1: The testbed as a subset of the Reference Architec-
ture for IIoT and Industrial Control Systems Testbeds [6]
3.1 Physical processes
3.1.1 Water treatment plant. We integrated an off-the-shelf water
treatment training rig fromGunt2, a Germanmanufacturer of indus-
trial training equipment, into our testbed. The Gunt CE-581 water
2https://www.gunt.de/en/products/process-engineering/water-treatment/
multistage-water-treatment/water-treatment-plant-1/083.58100/ce581/glct-1:
pa-148:ca-255:pr-57
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Water plant ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Factory ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
BMS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Control board ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Comms ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Security ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Software ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Industrial IIoT ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mobile testbed ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Training and
prototyping
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1: Summary of testbed aspects and how they relate to
use cases and requirements
treatment plant consists of a three stage filtration, absorption and
ion exchange process, used to deliver a training program focused
on the chemical processes of cleaning and testing water. The rig
uses a single pump to deliver dirty water through the system, four
electro-mechanical valves for selecting which of the three stages
are utilised, and a range of digital and analogue sensors includ-
ing flow rate, temperature and pressure sensors. Our deployment
of the Gunt CE-581 was customised by the manufacturer to our
specifications for security experimentation. We had a removable
copper pipe inserted into the system to allow for the easy inclusion
of additional sensors, and a further safety overflow system added
to the process in case of over-pressurisation. The CE-581 allows
us to meet a number of our requirements – due to its multi-stage
process it meets our complexity and scalability requirements (and
can be expanded with new sensors through our modification), and
supports diversity in terms of both the control architecture and
process itself (with multiple sensor and control outputs to consider).
The water treatment plant, in its entirety, can be used across all
five of our use cases.
The Gunt CE-581 water treatment plant comes with a control
cabinet containing a basic Eaton programmable logic controller
(PLC). We replaced this with a custom-built control board, which
can be seen in Figure 3. In our testbed, the primary control PLC for
the CE-581 is a Siemens S7-1500 coupled with a Siemens ET-200S
PLC for pump control, representing further diversity and complex-
ity more akin to real-world deployment. The PLCs are connected
to the water rig by custom cable harnesses routed through swap-
pable terminal blocks within the water rig control cabinet. The
swappable terminal blocks allow us to revert the CE-581 back to
the original control system for maintenance. The board also fea-
tures a Schneider ScadaPack32 remote terminal unit (RTU). A more
detailed description of the control board design in provided in Sec-
tion 3.2. Networking on the board is provided by a 16 portWestermo
industrial layer 2 managed routable ethernet switch, complimented
with a Checkpoint firewall which can act both as a firewall and as
a data tap within the field site, as shown in Figure 4.
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Key:
1 Input (dirty) & output (clean) water tanks
2 Filtration tanks
3 Absorption tanks
4 De-ionisation tanks
5 Wireless HMI
6 Original control cabinet, replaced by field site board
7 Safety bunds
8 IO cabling to field site board
Figure 2: Water treatment process
3.1.2 Model factory. Our second process is a model factory from
Fishertechnik3. Designed to train ICS engineers, the factory consists
of four highly interconnected and dependant processes – picking,
processing, sorting and storing. The factory contains a large amount
of both analogue and digital interfaces (I/O), with multiple sensors
and motors to coordinate. This presents a high degree of complexity
in synchronising the four processes, allowing us to run experimen-
tation on a highly complex and large scale process whilst being
deployable within a lab by virtue of being physically small enough
to fit on a table.
3.1.3 Building management system (BMS). To study further con-
vergence issues, our building management system was custom de-
signed and built for the lab. The BMS is of a dual interconnected PLC
design consisting of a primary controller, the Trend IQ4e, which
is connected to a smaller sub-field site Trend IQ3 PLC. Together
these represent both current and legacy deployments, again as one
is likely to find in the real world. The main control cabinet contains
3https://www.fischertechnik.de/en/products/simulating/training-models/536634-
sim-factory-simulation-24v-simulation
a number of controls, environmental sensors and actuators to rep-
resent typical mechanical & engineering (M&E) scenarios such as
heating, cooling, lighting etc. Additionally, this cabinet also con-
tains a number of gateway devices, such as the North Commander
and a Phillips Hue Bridge, to allow for the onward deployment of
both commercial and consumer IoT devices as one might find in
evolving commercial settings. The sub-field site provides additional
sensor / actuator space in a controlled environment. As Trend Con-
trols limit programming and maintenance access to their PLCs in
live deployments, our deployment is made in a similar manner such
that the PLCs themselves can be viewed as black boxes. This is more
representative of how they would be deployed in the wild.
3.2 Control board design
For each field site, we make use of a standardised control board to
which all of the ICS devices for that site are mounted. An example
of this board, used to control the water treatment plant, can be seen
in Figure 3. As well as the ICS devices themselves, the board also
features 24 volt power distribution and networking.
The board is designed in such a way that the PLCs are mounted
on removable plates, and connected to removable terminal blocks
on the board rather than directly to the process. All wires are
individually numbered, and documented, allowing for the relatively
easy swapping of PLCs on the board. The board is designed to hold
2 larger PLCs, 2 RTUs and associated equipment, though could hold
multiple smaller devices if required. This design result in meeting
our complexity & diversity requirement.
To meet safety requirements, the 240VAC to 24VDC power sup-
plies for the board are housed inside a secured box below the control
board. This box also feature an emergency stop button to shut power
down to the board. By isolating the 240V supply, all exposed wiring
on the control board is limited to a safe 24V. As the control boards
are located within a secured room with limited access, the board
can remain open rather than in a closed cabinet as with the main
BMS.
We currently have one board in operation, and are in the process
of building two further boards utilising the same design, the first to
cater for the factory simulator, and then further physical processes.
3.3 Communication and networking
The design of the network is largely the same as in our previous
testbed [12]. The network is split into three parts: OT, IT and Exper-
imental. The architecture of this network can be seen in Figure 4.
Each network is allocated a /24 address space, as well as a virtual
local area network (VLAN). VLANs are connected to our virtualisa-
tion server (see Section 3.5), allowing us to easily connect different
virtual machines to the various networks. The network is designed
to be scalable, whilst minimising the complexity of configuring the
network for experimentation. As well as providing networking for
ICS devices, the network is also configured to allow us to connect
other types of devices, such as our BMS system and IIoT devices,
to facilitate convergence use cases.
Our testbed network is isolated from the wider university net-
work to provide minimal chance of outside influence (for exam-
ple, through attack). The only connection to the outside world is
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Key:
1 & 2 Digital Inputs\Outputs (32 each)
3 & 4 Analogue Inputs\Outputs (16 each)
5 & 6 Secondary PLC\RTU Housing
7 Primary Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)
8 Primary Remote Terminal/Telemetry Unit
9 24VDC Distribution
10 WiFi Access Point
11 L3 Managed Ethernet Switch
12 Firewall
13 240VAC to 24V DC Power Supplies
14 Ethernet Back-haul to Core Network Infrastructure
15 IO Cabling to Physical Process
Figure 3: Field Site Control Board
through a managed virtual private network (VPN) router which
sits on the gateway and only allows authorised partners access to
the testbed. Similarly, a 4G connection from the mobile testbed can
be tunnelled through the gateway in order to link the mobile setup
into the main testbed network as its own field site. This external
connection allows for those partners to access varying levels of the
testbed—from a single process through to the entire system as re-
quired for experimentation. It also caters for the federation of other
testbeds into ours, thus providing another route for extensibility
and complexity.
In order to facilitate data capture, every VLAN has a spanning
port allowing us to capture full network data from any part of both
the IT and OT networks.
Whilst most of the network is contained within a single server
rack within a secured room, the management and security opera-
tions centre (SOC) networks are physically routed into our opera-
tions centre. SOC machines are directly connected to this network,
within which there is a managed ethernet switch allowing for ma-
chines to be routed directly to different VLANs as required.
We also maintain a discrete experimental wireless network, sep-
arated from our testbed network, which is granted direct access
to the wider internet through the university network. This net-
work is for working with IoT devices which cannot be connected
to the main testbed network, or to the main university network,
but require an active internet connection.
3.3.1 Software-defined networking (SDN). We are currently in the
process of building a software-defined version of our testbed net-
work both in a physical setup utilising commercial SDN switches,
as well as a fully virtual environment using OpenVSwitch4 virtual
switches. The physical switches support the Openflow SDN proto-
col, and so can be used with many different controller architectures.
This will allow us to explore the potential security impact of intro-
ducing software-defined networking into OT / IT environments.
3.4 Security (Cyber and Physical)
As part of our safety requirement, we require controls to be put in
place around the testbed environment to minimise risk of damage
to the testbed, or indeed those operating it.
The testbed network is isolated from the wider university net-
work. This allows the testbed to run with a lessened risk of security
breach from the internet or elsewhere within the university (and
prevents attacks from leaking out of the testbed). However it has
the disadvantage that machines within the network do not have
internet access (which makes updating software a difficult process).
External access is through a certificate based VPN connection.
Access to virtual machines located within the testbed is managed
by Active Directory (AD), with different levels of access based on
requirement. Testbed admins have full administrator rights across
all machines, whilst other researchers who need to simply access
machines have standard user access.
All network points into the testbed are located within phys-
ically secured, and restricted access, rooms. For devices that sit
within the communal areas (such as the water treatment plant and
BMS system), I/O and networking cables are routed to inside the
process cabinets which remain locked. This minimises the risk of
unauthorised devices being connected to the network.
In order to prevent contamination of the testbed, we operate a
“clean” machine policy for connecting to the testbed. Apart from
the dedicated SOC desktop machines, only a small number of desig-
nated maintenance laptops are connected to the testbed through the
4http://www.openvswitch.org
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Figure 4: Testbed network diagram
management network. These machines are regularly wiped clean,
and only connected to the internet when absolutely necessary. Live
bridging between the testbed and internet accessible networks is
not permitted.
3.5 Software
The software deployment within the testbed is critical for all of our
use cases and testbed requirements, and broadly splits into one of
two categories. The first is software used for testbed operations
(the experimental level within the architecture presented in Fig-
ure 1, including applications for security and data collection). The
second category is software that would be considered part of the
operational environment either at the control or production levels
of the architecture.
To ease maintenance and deployment, all software is installed
into virtual machines running inside VMWare vSphere. As well
as specialist ICS software, such as ClearSCADA, we also maintain
virtual machines with other useful software installed. For exam-
ple, we utilise a Windows 7 virtual machine, connected to the OT
LAN VLAN, containing all the software necessary for configuring
Siemens devices.
The virtualisation server includes multiple base VM images, cov-
ering multiple windows and Linux variants, which can be used
when building new virtual machines on the testbed.Wherever possi-
ble, software is installed bymounting clean USB sticks containing in-
stallation files into the virtual machines. Where installing/updating
software or operating system is only possible with an active inter-
net connection, VMs are downloaded to one of our maintenance
laptops, disconnected from the testbed, a temporary internet con-
nection established, the appropriate actions performed, and then
uploaded to the virtualisation server.
3.5.1 Data storage. Directly connected to the virtualisation server
is a high-capacity data storage array. The storage array allows
for multiple virtual partitions to be created, which can be directly
attached to virtual machines within vSphere using iSCSI connec-
tions. Partitions are used for hosting template virtual machines,
as well as backups of deployed machines. Further partitions are
used to provide high capacity storage for individual VMs for data
including telemetry and network traces to satisfy our data capture
requirement.
3.6 Industrial IoT (IIoT)
As one of our use cases is issues around convergence of OT and
IoT, we make use of a number of diverse hardware and software
variants of IIoT. IIoT hardware includes multiple WirelessHART
sensors and transmitters, along with WirelessHART gateways. In
order to reduce complexity, we also have bespoke internal projects
to produce IIoT sensors with near hot-swappable wireless protocols,
for example through the use of Arduino devices which can convert
to WirelessHART, Zigbee or HTTP(s) as needed [18].
We also make use of IIoT software solutions within the testbed
environment. For example, we use KEPServerEX from Kepware,
which provides data aggregation capabilities for ICS devices from
multiple manufacturers. Thingworx, a cloud IIoT platform, is de-
ployed within the IT DMZ network. A more detailed explanation
and example use case of this software is provided in Section 5.
3.7 Mobile testbed
To satisfy a need to both understand the integration of mobile
datacomms into the testbed for remote field sites, and to provide
a portable demonstrator we have built a mobile field site. This
consists of a full control system (including 2 PLCs, a RTU and HMI),
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and a simple small scale physical process. This box is partly used as
an outreach tool, allowing demonstration at events and meetings
without having to rely on a remote connection to the main testbed.
It also serves as a self-contained miniature testbed that can be used
for research projects isolated from the main testbed. When required,
this mobile setup can be connected to the main testbed via a 4G
radio connection, appearing as its own field site. It can then use this
connection to provide access to the software services that make up
the main testbed. A breakdown of the mobile demo box can be seen
in Figure 5.
3.8 Training and prototyping
Whilst building the testbed it became apparent that the complex-
ity, and value, of the testbed created a need to train new students
and inexperienced researchers to be able to practice ICS concepts
without the risk of damaging the testbed itself. Similarly, for re-
search projects that result in direct access to the testbed through
software, it is safer to develop and test outside of the main testbed
before deployment for data gathering. Jumping straight into deploy-
ment on the production testbed can be complex, and so by moving
through the three stages with increasing complexity researches can
gradually build up approaches.
A two tier setup is used outside of the testbed for training. The
first is a virtual environment utilising FactoryIO5, which allows for
the simulation of multiple physical processes with full 3D render-
ing. This software can be controlled by both virtual PLCs, certain
physical Siemens and Allen Bradley PLCs via ethernet connections
alone, or can be physically wired to other PLCs using USB data
interface devices. This is useful as a first stage training process with
minimal risk of damaging equipment. The second tier is a tabletop
physical process consisting of a multi-conveyor sorting process
produced by LJCreate6. The device consists of multiple sensors
and actuators providing a detailed model of a real-world process.
This comes pre-configured with Siemens S7-1200 PLCs, but can be
controlled from other devices if desired.
We require research projects to be tested on these setups, or the
mobile demonstration box, before deployment to the main testbed.
4 LESSONS LEARNED
In our previous work, we provided a list of ten lessons learned
in building an ICS testbed [12]. In this section we revisit each of
these, and describe how well they stand-up against two years of
additional experience. We arrange these past lessons into three
groups – those we found to be valid, those we no longer consider to
be critical, and those that made us go oops! (i.e. valid yet challenging
to follow in practice). From these, we derive a set of two refined
lessons based on our past lessons, and five new lessons to provide
a total of seventeen.
L1: Device and technology selections should be
market-driven
Status: Prior & Valid
5https://factoryio.com
6http://www.ljcreate.com/uk/programs/engineering/control-and-instrumentation/
hardware/318/industrial-control-teaching-set-siemens-detail
Process box
Control box
Key:
1 Conveyor Belt
2 Object Detection & Measurement Sensors
3 Pneumatic Sorters
4 Reject Bin
5 Secondary Programmable Logic Controller
6 Primary Programmable Logic Controller
7 Remote Terminal/Telemetry Unit
8 L3 Managed Ethernet Switch
9 Wireless Hart Transceiver
10 4G Radio (for backhaul to testbed)
11 Human Machine Interface (HMI)
Figure 5: Mobile conveyor/sort process & field site
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Summary: When building an ICS testbed, it is important to ensure
that design choices are led by industry, including the selection of
devices and protocols in use.
Reflection: From the start of the design process, our testbed was
developed to be as close to a real-world deployment as possible, both
drawing on our previous experience and further interaction with
industry experts. We cover legacy and non-legacy hardware from
vendors including Siemens, Allen Bradley, Schneider, Yokogawa,
Delta, Honeywell, Trend, Emerson, Westermo and Checkpoint.
L2: Homogeneity and heterogeneity in field sites
Status: Prior & Valid
Summary: Device selections in field sites should be both homoge-
neous, where manufacturing sites use devices from a single manu-
facturer, and heterogeneous, where devices from different manufac-
turers are mixed. This also includes legacy vs non-legacy devices,
as would be the norm in non-greenfield sites.
Reflection: We have designed the testbed such that changing
device selections is an easy process. As we have built the control
board to be readily swappable, we can – with minimal effort –
choose different devices to incorporate into each manufacturing
site. This is backed up by our large selection of devices from different
manufacturers (legacy and non-legacy).
L3: Process diversity is not always crucial
Status: Prior & less critical
Summary: Having a single, simple process is preferred to process
diversity, as it allows for easier diversity of the control architecture.
A complex process means that swapping control devices is much
harder, for example due to rewiring requirements.
Reflection: We make two observations about this lesson. First,
having a more complex physical process allows for a testbed that
more closely resembles a real-world environment. Whilst we agree
that this can mean more work to swap control devices, there are
approaches to mitigate this (see Sec. 3.2). Secondly, we also argue
that when looking at issues around convergence, process diversity
does matter. As an example, in a real-world environment the build-
ing management system and a factory process may well be on the
same network, having a convergence influence over each other. A
power distribution process can have a direct impact on a smart
factory floor process. Having multiple physical process allows the
exploration of such issues.
L4: Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) is not essential
in the Manufacturing Zone
Status: Prior & Valid
Summary: Due to a lack of accurate mathematical models for rep-
resenting the behaviour of sensors and actuators, HIL is not viable
for increasing scalability within a testbed. As process diversity is
not crucial, real devices can be used and so HIL is not necessary.
Reflection: As before, we still believe HIL is not essential in the
manufacturing zone. Whilst we argue below for the use of software-
based simulation for training and prototyping purposes, using HIL
for scalability with the production testbed is not desirable over
actual physical processes. As we have adopted process diversity to
explore issues of convergence, we have a large volume of sensor and
actuator data to utilise without the need for simulation. Further, we
are also in the process of designing a wireless sensor system to allow
for the easy installation of non-wireless sensors across the different
physical processes, allowing for further ease of deployment.
L5: Simulations in the Manufacturing Zone are
not favoured (OL5)
Status: Prior & Less critical
Summary: Whilst software simulations are cost effective, they
do not provide accuracy and reliability in mimicking real-world
operations. Whilst using physical devices is far more expensive, the
cost is acceptable for the experimental accuracy gained.
Reflection: We maintain that, within the production testbed, soft-
ware simulations are not favourable. However, software simulations
can prove to be a valuable asset within the wider testbed environ-
ment. For example. software simulations of both processes and
control devices are a useful training tool for researchers to become
more familiar with concepts, such as PLC programming. Simu-
lations can also be used as a prototyping stage when preparing
experiments to be run on the production testbed, reducing the risk
of damaging expensive physical equipment (see Sec. 3.8).
L6: Virtualisation and VLANs provide ease of
integration and scaling
Status: Prior & Valid
Summary: Making use of virtualisation and VLANs is easier, and
cheaper, to deploy than physical hardware and allows for easier
integration of new systems, and expansion.
Reflection: As in our previous testbed, we exclusively use vir-
tualisation for deploying systems within the testbed. All virtual
machines are hosted on a single, high-powered server. This includes
an array of base virtual machine images for different operating sys-
tems, allowing the easy deployment of new workstations. When
combined with the use of VLANs, we can install a system anywhere
within the testbed from the virtualisation management interface.
L7: Employ a Management Network
Status: Prior & Valid
Summary: By utilising a management network, which gives re-
searchers a single access point to applications and tools located
anywhere within the testbed, the complexity of the experimental
layer is reduced.
Reflection: We replicated the use of a management network in
our testbed. Within our operations centre, we maintain a physi-
cal switch that allows devices to connect to the management net-
work. Through this connection, a remote desktop connection can
be started to all virtual machines.
L8: Setup Multiple Manufacturing Zones
Status: Prior & Valid
Summary: Separating devices into discrete manufacturing zones,
on top of providing a more real-world scenario, allows for multiple
researchers to conduct their activities simultaneously.
Reflection: We follow the same principle on our testbed. We treat
each control board (as shown in Figure 3) as one production-level
manufacturing zone. Each board supports a full control architecture
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for one or more physical processes, with each board supplied with
its own field site network allowing for experimentation to be run
on each zone independently.
L9: Comprehensively document as you build
Status: Prior & Oops!
Summary: To ensure accuracy and avoid extra time and cost in
documenting a testbed after it is built, ensure that documentation
is written during the build process, and budget for it if necessary.
Reflection: On commencement of the building of the testbed,
this was one of the lessons that we attempted to follow as closely
as possible. This was successful for a short period. However, as
more complex portions of the testbed were developed, and time-
frames shortened, the documentation process was almost entirely
forgotten. This has led to a requirement to document post-build,
which will undoubtedly take far longer than if done in progress
and posses additional challenges to both recollection and accuracy.
L10: Optimise data logging for security purposes
Status: Prior & Valid
Summary: Collecting and distributing data from the testbed is a
complicated manual process. Steps should be taken to try and opti-
mise and automate the data collection process for specific security
use cases.
Reflection: We still consider that, for certain security use cases,
steps should be taken to simplify and optimise data capture, as well
as our research around IDS systems and dataset generation. This is
reflected by the major requirement for data collection.
L11: Temporality matters
Status: Refined (from lesson 2)
Summary: In lesson 2, we cover that it is important to have het-
erogeneity in manufacturing zones. We feel it is important to bring
out the heterogeneity of devices from different time periods into a
separate lesson. Whilst it is tempting to focus on the newest models
of ICS equipment, in the real-world, installations will often have a
mix of newer and older, legacy devices. When evaluating the secu-
rity of these systems it is important to take into account differing
security levels of different generations of devices, even from the
same manufacturer. For example, a current generation PLC from
a manufacturer may use the same protocol as an older generation
model, but incorporate extra features to fix known vulnerabilities.
Both devices could be installed within a real-world scenario due to
the common protocol, however if the older equipment is not taken
into account then potential security issues could be missed.
L12: Build ‘swappable’ capability into the
control architecture
Status: Refined (from lesson 3)
Summary: In lesson 3, we argued that one of the benefits of a
single, simple process is that it allows for effective swappability of
control equipment through simple wiring and configuration. We
found that process diversity is actually useful. However, a slightly
different, and more proactive, approach needs to be taken to still
maintain swappability of devices. Due to the nature of the physical
infrastructure for control equipment, it can be a time intensive
procedure to swap out hardware across different processes. For ex-
ample, when replacing a PLC, one also has to replace the associated
wiring to the physical process. Therefore, the physical design of
how control boards are assembled should be such that swappability
is made as simple as possible. The control board we use, as seen in
Figure 3 and discussed in Section 3.2, has been designed to allow
for relatively easy swapping of control equipment. As all wiring
directly connected to the control equipment is contained within
the board (and is well labelled), a new PLC can be wired in with
minimal effort. The PLCs are also mounted on removable plates
allowing for easy mounting and removal.
L13: DIY vs Off-the-shelf vs Hybrid testbeds
Status: New
Summary: On one hand, buying off-the-shelf can be a far quicker
way to get a testbed up and running, with the added benefit that
the product will almost certainly be built to a higher standard
than achieved through a DIY approach. However, it is likely to be
more expensive to purchase (excepting labour) than an equivalent
DIY solution, and out-of-the-box be less configurable than a DIY
approach. Whilst a DIY approach may be cheaper, it it far more time
consuming and requires particular skill-sets not readily available.
In our deployment, we use an off-the-shelf approach for physical
processes with appropriate manufacturer customisations, but we
replace the off-the-shelf control system with our own DIY control
architecture (see Section 3.1.1 for more detail). When purchasing
off-the-shelf hardware to be attacked, ensuring there are sufficient
safety mechanisms in place is also critical.
Whilst a process can usually be considered safe during normal
operation (and have suitable measures to ensure safety), while the
system is under attack and the process is pushed past its limits,
potentially with safety mechanisms disabled, safety can no longer
be guaranteed. Measures should be taken during the design stage
to provide non-digital backups to safety mechanisms, which should
then be built into the off-the-shelf hardware.
Another disadvantage of off-the-shelf hardware is that it is often
not easily extendable. It is expected that during the lifetime of the
testbed, new hardware such as additional sensors may need to be
added. As an example, the following modifications were made to
our off-the-shelf water treatment process by the manufacturers in
order to provide safety and extensibility:
• Three pressure release valves, set to 0.2 bar above the default
safety cut-off of the system, were installed to release pressure
in the system in the case where the pressure alarm is disabled
due to attack.
• On the default configuration, the pipe connecting the filtra-
tion and absorption stages is fixed. This was replaced with a
removable copper pipe, to allow us to introduce extra sen-
sors into the system with relative ease. This can be seen in
Figure 2.
L14: Maintenance needs to be considered from
the design stage
Status: New
Summary: Introducing physical processes also introduces main-
tenance requirements, which grow with the size and complexity
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of testbeds. There is a time and cost involved with keeping physi-
cal processes operational, which needs to be considered from the
outset of design. Our water treatment plant has had two major
maintenance issues that have required intervention. Firstly, as the
plant handles water (which sits at around 22°c), there is a risk of
Legionella bacteria developing if the water is left to stagnate (as it
would if the system is not run for longer periods of time). To combat
this, a schedule of regular cleaning (including water replacement),
and running to prevent stagnation, was introduced to minimise risk.
Secondly, valves used to remove air from the system contain a filter
(to prevent filtration material leaving the system) which rusted over,
preventing the system from filling properly. This requires periodic
inspection and replacement as necessary.
L15: Develop a reference architecture
Status: New
Summary: Our reference architecture [6] aims to provide guid-
ance in order to allow readers to produce a realistic, functional ICS
testbed. Producing this reference architecture required a consid-
erable amount of work, across multiple universities, drawing on
past experience of testbed building, and significant discussion with
industry. There were three main benefits to producing a reference
architecture:
(1) Further expansions to the testbed (for example, the addition
of manufacturing zones or field sites) is made simpler, as the
reference architecture can be followed.
(2) The reference architecture provides guidance to groups build-
ing their own testbeds, who may not necessarily have the
experience or industrial knowledge to design a realistic ar-
chitecture.
(3) If multiple testbeds are built following the same reference
architecture, it is far easier to provide the functionality to
connect different testbeds, even across different institutions,
to provide a larger scale test environment.
L16: Humans in the loop
Status: New
Summary: It is important to utilise subject specialists when design-
ing and building an ICS testbed. From the design stage, one needs
to ensure that what is being purchased matches the requirements
of the testbed and presents a realistic representation of real-world
usage. During the building phase, specialist skills may be required,
outside of the remit of a computer scientist, to actually connect parts
together. As an example, connecting our own PLCs to the water
treatment plant required a large amount of specialised wiring. To
ensure this was done correctly, and to a high standard, we utilised
the university’s engineering technician team to build the control
board and carry out all wiring activities.
L17: Provide infrastructure for training and
prototyping
Status: New
Summary: Working with, and on, ICS requires specialist skill-sets.
Rather than let inexperienced users have direct access to a primary
testbed, it is important to provide infrastructure for training and
practice, either through software simulation or through the use of
Lesson L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 L1
0
L1
1
L1
2
L1
3
L1
4
L1
5
L1
6
L1
7
Valid ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Less crit ✓ ✓
Refined ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Oops ✓
New ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 2: Summary of prior and new lessons
(relatively) low-cost training hardware. Similarly, providing infras-
tructure for prototyping approaches can offer a simpler setup for
rapid prototyping, and a proving ground before deployment on the
primary testbed.
4.1 Overall lessons learnt
Table 2 provides a summary of the prior, refined and new lessons.
We believe that both sets of lessons should be taken as a whole. Even
the prior lessons that we have adapted can still stand, depending on
the aims of a testbed building project. Whilst we found that prior
lesson 3 (process diversity) is no longer accurate, in particular for a
testbed looking at issues around convergence, for smaller testbed
deployments this lesson can still be useful. Similarly, whilst we still
maintain, as per prior lesson 5, that simulation of processes is not
desirable within the production testbed, software simulation has a
valuable use for training and prototyping.
5 DISCUSSION
The security testbed was built based on prior lessons and against
a reference architecture for ICS & IIoT security testbeds [6]. By
way of a use case for the testbed, we developed a demonstrator
for the PETRAS National Centre of Excellence for IoT Systems7 to
highlight potential security vulnerabilities that manifest as a result
of poorly considered convergence of operational technology with
the industrial internet-of-things (IIoT). The “Securing IoT in Critical
National Infrastructure” (SecCNIoT) demonstrator builds directly
upon the security testbed through the inclusion of commercial IIoT
solutions to accurately reflect a real-world deployment. The demon-
strator also covers multiple aspects from our research areas. The
demonstrator exploits known ICS device security vulnerabilities,
and also incorporates elements of active failure (human error) [4, 5].
5.1 The SecCNIoT demonstrator
The overall conceptual architecture of the demonstrator can be
seen in Figure 6. Data aggregation from the testbed is performed
by the KEPServerEX8 (henceforth referred to as Kepware) data
aggregation platform. Kepware collects data from multi-vendor
ICS devices in the testbed. In our deployment, Kepware resides
within a Microsoft Windows 7 VM, located within the OT DMZ
network on the field site for the water treatment process—field site
1—communicating directly with the devices on its related control
board.
7https://www.petrashub.org/petras-demonstrators-bringing-research-into-the-real-
world
8https://www.kepware.com/en-us/
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Figure 6: Testbed environment for SecCNIoT demonstrator
The IIoT cloud platform for the demonstrator was provided by
Thingworx9, which supports the development of web-based appli-
cations utilising IIoT data. The manufacturers of Thingworx (PTC)
acquired Kepware in 2016, and since have marketed Kepware and
Thingworx as an IIoT solution, with Kepware providing data inputs
to the Thingworx platform.
Thingworx is deployed on top of an Ubuntu virtual machine
(supplied prebuilt by PTC) and uses Apache Tomcat 8.5 as its un-
derlying platform. Our deployment operates Thingworx within a
virtual cloud (i.e. inside our closed testbed environment). A trusted
communication link between Kepware and Thingworx is achieved
by way of a default, pre-configured, HTTP connection.
5.2 Compromising the SecCNIoT demonstrator
The demonstration takes advantage of a number of aspects of this
IIoT deployment, and is achieved in three primary steps. Prior to
the attack we replace the KepServerEx manual, an Adobe PDF
held on the Kepware server, with one which we have modified to
contain a malicious payload. Whilst we take the liberty of doing
this manually for the purposes of the demonstration, processes
by which such a file might make it to a server, or an engineer’s
trusted workstation, are many and varied including USB drives, in-
ternet download, an injection into the supply chain (akin to the 2019
malware attack on Asus10) or a direct hack of the workstation itself.
Step 1—The Thingworx cloud platform is compromised by exploit-
ing one or more of the well known CVE vulnerabilities published
9https://www.ptc.com/en/products/iiot
10https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/asus-supply-chain-attack
for Tomcat 8.511 in the pre-configured state as shipped. In this state
we are able to load our attack script to the Thingworx VM which,
when executed, terminates the Thingworx process resulting in a
loss of communication with Kepware. At this point we create an
HTTP listener on the VM, ready for outbound connections from
Kepware.
Step 2—As the Kepware workstation reports a communication er-
ror, resolution is sought by the engineer who opens the malicious
manual. The payload displays the manual as expected, however
it also re-establishes the trusted outbound communication to the
Thingworx VM, only now this is intercepted by the listener created
in Step 1 above. As the connection is made, the attack script creates
a reverse proxy in the VM providing remote access directly to the
Kepware server.
Step 3—With a trusted connection established, the attack script
undertakes reconnaissance of the ICS devices that are feeding data
to the Kepware server, and provides a conduit for a number of pre-
defined attacks upon PLCs, HMIs and RTUs. Through this process
we are able to disable the over-pressure safety system for the water
treatment plant and increase pump speeds to generate an unsafe
operating state.
5.3 Situating the testbed in the landscape
To evaluate our testbed, and through the use of the SecCNIoT
demonstrator, we adopt the approach used in our prior testbed
11https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-45/product_id-
887/version_id-199711/Apache-Tomcat-8.5.0.html
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[19]
[2]
[8]
[21]
LAN [12]
BRIS
Key: Black dots indicate that a testbed supports a fea-
ture, grey dots indicate that the work acknowledges a
requirement of a feature
Table 3: Comparison of testbed functions.
work [12]. In this we utilise the ten categories of testbed function-
ality as described in [9, 13, 20], being:
(1) Physical device diversity (PD): Supports a wide range of phys-
ical devices; (2) Industrial protocol diversity (ID): Supports a wide
range of industrial communication protocols; (3) Process diversity
(PC): Supports more than one type of physical operational process;
(4) Flexibility (FX): Supports multiple configurations; (5) Scalability
(SC): Replicates the scale of the ICSs when needed; (6) Fidelity (FD):
Mimics as close and accurate as possible a real ICS; (7) Simulation
Support (SS): Offers simulations for field devices or process; (8) Soft-
ware to support security analysis (SA): e.g., parsing tools for sniffed
packets; (9) Optimisation for monitoring (OM): Supports optimising
data logging to reduce the impact of security on general operation;
(10) Openness (OP): Supports remote access or data openness.
Table 3 presents our comparison, for the new testbed, in the
same format as used previously for ease of reference. Where the
lack of process diversity and simulation acted as a conscious design
choice in our previous testbed, through our adapted viewpoint
of existing lessons, and inclusion of new lessons, we have been
able to design and build our new testbed to meet all functionality
categories. While we acknowledge some of these are still in their
infancy, the testbed’s fundamental construct is designed to support
and manage their growth.
6 CONCLUSION
Our prior work in building an ICS security testbed resulted in the
generation of ten key lessons useful for anyone designing and
building their own testbed. In this paper we present how—when
building a new greenfield testbed of significantly greater scale and
extensibility—those ten guiding lessons played out, offering an
opportunity to evaluate their usefulness. We found that, whilst
most were still valid, two lessons on physical process diversity
and the use of software simulations were no longer entirely valid
when building a testbed at scale. A further lesson to document
whilst you build, though valid, was in practice all but impossible to
follow due to the pace of development and need to work through
implementation challenges.
This paper contributes our attempt to validate our prior work,
and in doing so brings a further seven additional lessons to the
community. Two are refinements of the prior lessons, and five are
wholly new. Together these now seventeen lessons represent a
guide to others who wish to embark of their own ICS security
testbeds, offering sound advice based on theory, practice and a lot
of mistakes. Far better to learn from others than remake them.
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